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Significant Cases Supreme Court Cases Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) summary Michigan Court Cases Joseph Workman v. The Board of Education of Detroit, 18 Mich
400 (1863) summary Case Name: Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) Defendants: John H. Ferguson, judge of the criminal District Court for the parish of Orleans Location: New Orleans, Louisiana Year : Argued: April 13, 1896 Decided: May 18, 1896 Significant Points: Homer Plessy a biracial man challenged a Louisiana
law requiring railroad companies in the state to provide "equal
but separate accommodations for the white and colored race." The
court decided 'separate but equal' facilities were constitutional. This
ruling was extended to include schools. Justice John Marshall Harlan
was the sole dissenting opinion and he wrote "Our Constitution
is color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among its citizens."
Case Name: Cumming v. Board of Education of Richmond County, 175 U.S. 528 (1899) Plaintiffs: Cumming, Harper and Ladeveze Defendants: The Board of Education of Richmond County and Charles S. Bohler, tax collector. Location: Richmond County Georgia Year: Argued: October 30, 1899 Decided: December 18, 1899 Significant Points: The Court issued a unanimous opinion that upheld
a decision of white officials to close the black high school. The black
defendants demanded that the Court grant an injunction that would prevent
the use of taxes for the operation of the white high schools until the
county reestablished the black high school. This decision gave a green
light to school officials to discriminate. Case Name: Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) Plaintiffs: Gong Lum and Martha Lum Defendants: Superintendent of Education of the State of Mississippi Location: Mississippi Year: Argued: October 12, 1927 Decided: November 21, 1927 Significant Points: Gong Lum, a Chinese merchant in Mississippi sent
his daughter Martha to a white school, and she was sent home because
she was not white. The Court ruled for the state citing Cumming Chief
Justice William Howard Taft said the question of who can attend state
schools 'has been may times decided to be within the constitutional
power of the state legislature to settle without intervention of the
federal courts under the Federal Constitution.' Case Name: State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) Plaintiffs: Lloyd Gaines Defendants: CANADA, REGISTRAR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI Location: Missouri Year: Argued: November 9, 1938 Decided: December 12, 1938 Significant Points: The Supreme Court ruled that Missouri could not
satisfy its obligation to provide equal protection by sending an African
American resident to an out-of-state law school and that Lloyd Gaines
must thus be admitted to the all-white University of Missouri School
of Law. This case was the beginning of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's
effort to chip away at the separate-but-equal doctrine. The State of
Missouri set up a separate inferior law school in 1939, forcing the
NAACP back to court. However early in 1939 Gaines disappeared never
to surface again, some suspected foul play others thought he accepted
a bribe. Whatever happened the NAACP was forced to drop the case because
it not longer had a plaintiff. Case Name: Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) Plaintiffs: Herman Sweatt Defendants: Theophilus S. Painter, President of The University of Texas Location: Houston, Texas Year: Argued: April 4, 1950 Decided: June 5, 1950 Significant Points: In 1946, with the support of the NAACP, Herman
Marion Sweatt applied for admission to The University of Texas School
of Law. The University registrar rejected his application because Sweatt
was an African American and UT was a segregated institution. Sweatt,
with NAACP counsel, sued. Although Sweatt lost in state court, the United
States Supreme Court in 1950 ordered the integration of The University
of Texas School of Law and also The University's Graduate School. Case Name: McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) Plaintiffs: George McLaurin Defendants: Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education Location: Oklahoma Year: Argued: April 3-4, 1950 Decided: June 5, 1950 Significant Points: On January 28, 1948, a black retired professor,
George McLaurin, applied to the University of Oklahoma to pursue a Doctorate
in Education. School authorities were required to deny him admission
solely because of his race under Oklahoma statutes which made it a misdemeanor
to maintain or operate, teach, or attend a school at which both whites
and African Americans were enrolled or taught. McLaurin filed a complaint
to gain admission. On October 6, the Court for the Western District
of Oklahoma found unconstitutional those parts of the Oklahoma statute
that denied McLaurin admission. With this ruling the University's Board
of Regents voted to admit McLaurin, but on a segregated basis. Case Name: Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) Plaintiffs: Elmer Henderson Defendants: Southern Railway and Interstate Commerce Commission Location: Maryland Year: Argued: April 3, 1950 Decided: June 5, 1950 Case Name: Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 Defendants: Roderick Elliott (Briggs), Board of Education of Topeka Kansas (Brown), County School Board of Prince Edward County Virginia (Davis), Location: Clarendon County, South Carolina (Briggs), Topeka, Kansas (Brown), Prince Edward County Virginia (Davis), Wilmington, Delaware (Gebhart) Year: Argued: December 9, 1952 Decided: May 17, 1954 Significant Points: Ended de jure school segregation Case Name: Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) Plaintiffs: Spotswood Bolling, Jr. Defendants: Sharpe Location: Washington D.C. Year: Argued: December 10-11. 1952 Decided: May 17, 1954 Significant Points: This is a companion case to Brown v. Board of Education,
supra, p 873. In the latter case the Supreme Court held that the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from
maintaining racially segregated public schools. In the present case,
in an opinion by Warren, Ch. J., it was held that the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment prohibits racial segregation in the public schools
of the District of Columbia. Case Name: Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka, "Brown II," 349 U.S.
294 Plaintiffs: Oliver Brown Defendants: Board of Education of Topeka Kansas Location: Topeka, Kansas Year: Argued: April 11-15, 1955 Decided: May 31, 1955 Significant Points: The principle that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional was announced by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education (and three companion cases) 347 US 483, 98 L ed 873, 74 S Ct 686, 38 ALR2d 1180 (dealing with state public schools) and in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 US 497, 98 L ed 884, 74 S Ct 693 (dealing with public schools of the District of Columbia). In all these cases the Supreme Court requested further argument on the question of relief. In a supplemental opinion by Warren, Ch. J., the Supreme Court unanimously
reversed those courts below which had permitted racial segregation in
public schools, and remanded the cases with directions that these courts,
in fashioning and effectuating the decrees, should be guided by equitable
principles as defined in the opinion. The most important principle is
that the defendants should make a prompt and reasonable start toward
full compliance with the decision requiring desegregation and that the
burden rests upon them to establish that additional time is necessary
in the public interest and is consistent with good-faith compliance
at the earliest practicable date. The trial courts are directed to retain
jurisdiction of the cases during the period of transition. Case Name: Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 Plaintiff: William G. Cooper, President Little Rock School Broad Defendants: John Aaron Location: Little Rock, Arkansas Year: Argued: September 11, 1958 Decided: September 12, 1958 Significant Points: The School Board and the Superintendent of Schools
of Little Rock, Arkansas, filed the present petition in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas seeking a postponement
of a plan for desegregation of public schools which had been adopted
by the Board and approved by the appropriate federal courts. The court
refused to postpone further desegregation in the face of the official
and public hostility that had accompanied the integration the city's
Central High School. Case Name: Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Board of Education, 377 U.S. 218 Plaintiff: Griffin Defendants: County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia Location: Prince Edward County, Virginia Year: Argued: March 30, 1964 Decided: May 25, 1964 Case Name: Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, Va. 391 U.S. 430 Plaintiff: Green Defendants: County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia Location: New Kent County, Virginia Year: Argued: April 3, 1968 Decided: May 27, 1968 Significant Points: The case involved a freedom of choice plan established
in 1965 in New Kent County just east of Richmond. The plan resulted
in little desegregation. The Court ruled that such plans must be approved
only if effective in achieving desegregation. Case Name: Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 Plaintiff: Alexander Defendants: Holmes County Board of Education Location: Holmes County, Mississippi Year: Argued: October 23, 1969 Decided: October 29, 1969 Significant Points: President Nixon ordered a delay in court orders
that would have forced 33 school districts in Mississippi to produce
plans for segregation. The Legal Defense Fund appealed to the Court.
The Court ruled the standard of "all deliberate speed" was
no longer constitutionally permissible. The Court added, "The obligation
of every school district is to terminate dual school systems at once
and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools…These schools
were in which no person is to be effectively excluded from any school
because of race or color." Case Name: Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 Plaintiff: Darius Swann Defendant: Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Education Location: Charlotte, North Carolina Year: Argued: October 12, 1970 Decided: April 20, 1971 Significant Points: The Court ruled that a range of tools, including
school busing were appropriate to promote racial balance. However Swann
did not affect the North. Case Name: San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 Plaintiff: Demetrio Rodriguez Defendant: San Antonio Independent School District Location: San Antonio, Texas Year: Argued: October 12, 1972 Decided: March 21, 1973 Significant Points: Demetrio Rodriguez complaint was pointed at the
in egalitarian aspect of school funding: public schools supported by
local property taxes. School spending differed by as much twice the
amount in Alamo Heights as in Edgewood. The Court found no proof the
San Antonio's financing system disadvantaged any identifiable group
or that the poorest students lived only in the districts with the most
badly financed schools. Justice Lewis Powell wrote "The Equal Protection
Clause, does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages."
He added education was not a fundamental interest under the Constitution
and that levels of financing were only a part of what made good schools. Case Name: Keyes v. Denver School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 921 Plaintiff: Keyes Defendant: Denver School District Location: Denver, Colorado Year: 1973 Significant Points: Denver was the first nonsouthern city to have its
school policies challenged in the High Court. The Court all but ordered
Denver to start citywide busing. However, the Court did say de facto
segregation was insufficient grounds for judicial intervention, if a
school board could show that it did not intend to segregate. If segregation
stemmed from other sources such as housing arising from uncoordinated
private decisions. Case Name: Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 Plaintiff: Verda Bradley Defendant: William Milliken, Governor of Michigan Location: Detroit, Michigan Year: Argued: February 27, 1974 Decided: July 25, 1974 Significant Points: Overturned a lower court ruling that would have
abolished city-suburban school districts around Detroit. The ruling
would have affected fifty-three suburban districts and over 300,000
students. Chief Justice Burger wrote "The notion that school district
lines may be casually ignored or treated a mere administrative convenience
is contrary to the history of public education in our country."
The Court sent the case back to lower courts and told them to develop
remedies within the city limits. Case Name: Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 Plaintiff: Spangler Defendant: Pasadena City Board of Education Location: Pasadena, California Year: Argued April 27-28, 1976 Decided: June 28, 1976 Significant Points: The United States District Court for the Central
District of California denied motions, made in 1974, to amend its 1970
order for desegregation of the Pasadena Unified School District by eliminating
the requirement that there be no school "with a majority of any
minority students". The United States Supreme Court vacated the
Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
In an opinion by Rehnquist, J., expressing the views of six members
of the court, it was held that having established a racially neutral
system of student assignment in the school district by its 1970 order,
the District Court could not require the school district to rearrange
its attendance zones annually so as to insure perpetually a desirable
racial mix in the schools Case Name: Regents of The University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 Plaintiff: Allen Bakke Defendant: Regents of The University of California Location: Davis, California Year: Argued: October 12, 1977 Decided: June 28, 1978, Significant Points: A white male who had been denied admission to the
medical school at the University of California at Davis for two consecutive
years, instituted an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against
the Regents of the University in the Superior Court of Yolo County,
California, alleging the invalidity--under the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, a provision of the California Constitution,
and the proscription in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against
racial discrimination in any program receiving federal financial assistance--of
the medical school's special admissions program under which only disadvantaged
members of certain minority races were considered for 16 of the 100
places in each year's class, whereas members of any race could qualify
under the school's general admissions program for the other 84 places
in the class, the plaintiff having been denied admission to the school
under the general admissions program even though applicants with substantially
lower entrance examination scores had been admitted under the special
admissions program. Finding that the special admissions program operated
as a racial quota because minority applicants in the special program
were rated only against one another and 16 places in the class of 100
were reserved for them, the trial court (1) declared that the school
could not take race into account in making admissions decisions, (2)
held that the challenged admissions program violated the federal and
state constitutions and Title VI, but (3) refused to order the plaintiff's
admission because he had failed to prove that he would have been admitted
but for the existence of the special program. Justice Blackmun wrote
"In order to get beyond race we must first take account of race.
There is no other way….In order to treat persons equally, we must
treat them differently." Case Name: Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 Plaintiff: Board of Education of Oklahoma City Defendant: Robert L. Dowell Location: Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Significant Points: In 1972 Oklahoma City responded to a federal court
order by establishing a race-based busing plan. Whites left the city
causing more busing. In 1985 the school board introduced a student reassignment
plan that did away with busing elementary school children. The NAACP
opposed the plan and when to court. The federal district court backed
the city. The Court said court-ordered busing could be dropped when
school districts become resegregated because of private choices, and
all 'practicable" were taken to eliminate segregation. Case Name: Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 Plaintiff: Robert R. Freeman, Superintendent of DeKalb County Schools Defendant: Willie Eugene Pitts Location: De Kalb County, Georgia Year: Argued: October 7, 1991 Decided: March 31, 1992 Significant Points: In the county, a suburb of Atlanta, resegregation
was happening. Fifty percent of the black students in the county were
attending schools that were 90 percent black. Justice Kennedy wrote
"Where resegregation is a product not of state action but of private
choices, it does not have constitutional implications…It is beyond
the authority and beyond the practical ability of the federal courts
to try to counteract these kinds of continuous and massive demographic
shifts." Case Name: United States v. Fordice, Governor of Mississippi, 505 U.S. 717 Plaintiff: United States Justice Department Defendant: Kirk Fordice, Governor of Mississippi Location: Jackson, Mississippi Year: Argued : November 13, 1991 Decided: June 26, 1992 Significant Points: In 1992 the state of Mississippi still maintained
a dual higher education system with five predominantly white institutions
and three black institutions. The Court declared that the system sustained
racially discriminatory features, and forced the state to take "affirmative
steps" to dismantle the system of discrimination in its system
of higher education. Case Name: Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 Plaintiff: State of Missouri Defendant: Jenkins Location: Kansas City, Missouri Year: Argued: January 11, 1995 Decided: June 12, 1995 Significant Points: The Court defines the point at which a school district
can be released from a court ordered desegr Argued January 11, 1995-Decided
June 12, 1995 desegregation order. The Court's decision did not dismantle
the desegregation plan, stated that state was not forced to pay for
the plan. Also Justice Thomas complained about the psychological theories
that claimed "any school that black is inferior, and that blacks
cannot succeed without the company of whites." Case Name: Grutter, v. Lee Bollinger, et. al, Plaintiff: Barbara Grutter Defendant: Lee Bollinger, President of the University of Michigan Location: Ann Arbor, Michigan Year: Argued: April 1, 2003 Decided: June 23, 2003 Significant Points: The Law School's narrowly tailored use of race
in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining
the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body is not
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI. Case Name: Jennifer Gratz v. Lee Bollinger, Plaintiff: Jennifer Gratz Defendant: Lee Bollinger, President of the University of Michigan Location: Ann Arbor< Michigan Year: Argued: April 1, 2003 Decided: June 23, 2003 Significant Points: In an opinion by Rehnquist, Ch. J., joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., the court, applying strict scrutiny, held that the admission policy's automatic distribution of 20 points to every member of an underrepresented minority violated: (1) The equal protection clause, because the automatic-20-point program was not narrowly tailored to achieve the assertedly compelling interest in educational diversity that the university claimed justified the program, for: (a) The admissions policy did not provide individualized consideration of each characteristic of a particular applicant. (b) The college's program--to which most applications were not subjected--under which the file of an applicant who possessed a characteristic deemed important to the composition of the freshman class could be flagged for a review committee's individual consideration without regard to the points system, only emphasized the flaws of the admissions policy as a whole. (c) The fact that implementation of a program capable of providing individualized consideration might have presented administrative challenges did not render constitutional an otherwise problematic system. (2) Sections 1981 and 2000d, which the Supreme Court had indicated,
in earlier cases, were violated by discrimination that violated the
equal protection clause. Michigan Cases Case Name: Joseph Workman v. The Board of Education of Detroit, 18 Mich 400 Plaintiffs: Joseph Workman Defendants: The Board of Education of Detroit Location: Detroit, Michigan Year: Argued: May 7,1869 Decided: May 12, 1869 Significant Points: Joseph Workman attempted to enroll his son in the Duffield Union School and the son was denied admission based solely on his race. In 1842, the legislature had given the Detroit Board of Education full power and authority regarding the establishment of schools and educational policies. Detroit had subsequently created two schools specifically for African-American children and had required African Americans to travel, regardless of location, to those schools, which did not have higher-level grades. In 1867, the Michigan legislature enacted the general school law prescribing racial equality in Michigan school districts. The Detroit Board of Education fought this law on the premise that segregation spared African Americans from having to be confronted by "strong prejudice against the colored people among a large majority of the white population" and that the Detroit school charter had been re-enacted after the passage of the law. The Court's decision held that the law superseded the Detroit charter. The Court chose not to discuss arguments of policy and did not address the plaintiff's argument of injustice due to the inequality. This ruling did not provide for integration, but the subsequent segregation that dominated the 20th century was not founded on state law, in part thanks to the decision in Workman v Detroit Board of Education. The first case, Joseph Workman v. The Board of Education of Detroit,
Case Name: Donald Davis, Jr. v. School District of the City of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp. 734, 1970 Plaintiff: Donald Davis, Jr. Defendant: School District of the City of Pontiac Location: Pontiac, Michigan Year: February 17, 1970 Significant Points: Judge Damon Keith ruled that the Pontiac school system's defacto segregration was no different than the past dejure segregration practiced in the past by the Pontiac schools. Keith ordered the schools, faculty and adminstration of the Pontiac schools desegregrated. Case Name: Barbara Jean Berry v. School District of Benton Harbor 442 F. Supp. 1280; 1977 U.S. Dist. Plaintiff: Barbara Jean Berry Defendant: School District of Benton Harbor Location: Benton Harbor, Michigan Year: This case was originally filed in 1967 and has continued in the courts until 2002 Significant Points: In 1967 plaintiffs, black school children from the Benton Harbor School District, filed an action in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan alleging, that the predominantly black Benton Harbor Schools were segregated in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs' amended complaint named the Benton Harbor district, school board and supervisor; the Governor of the State of Michigan; the Michigan Attorney General; the Michigan State Board of Education and State Superintendent of Public Education; and the neighboring Coloma and Eau Claire school districts. A detailed review of the facts may be found in two separate opinions
of the District Court, 442 F. Supp. 1280 (W.D. Mich. 1977) and 467 F.
Supp. 630 (W.D. Mich. 1978) which determined the liability of each of
the defendants. This Court twice affirmed on liability issues. On May
1, 1981 the District Court entered a detailed and thoughtful remedial
order. Essentially, the order provided for the creation of several magnet
schools which, it was hoped, would result in the voluntary desegregation
of the Benton Harbor, Coloma and Eau Claire School districts. The District
Court found that two goals needed to be met in order for the Court's
desegregation plan to be successful: The Court affirmed the District Court's Remedial Order, including those
portions of the Order which provided for the affirmative hiring of black
staff by the Coloma and Eau Claire districts. By the start of the 1981-1982
academic year Coloma had hired a few black teachers and staff people.
A year later, however, the school district was faced with the prospect
of faculty layoffs for economic reasons. Coloma returned to the District
Court for clarification of the Remedial Order as it applied to the (newly
hired) black staff. The Superintendent of the Coloma district testified
that a layoff would likely result in the discharge of the black teachers,
staff members and aides since they had the least seniority. The Superintendent
also stated that it was expected that the layoffs would be permanent,
as the district did not anticipate any growth in faculty in the near
future. The supplemental order found that "those minority teachers
hired subsequent to this Court's May 1, 1981 Order are not subject to
layoff procedures should Coloma determine that teacher layoffs are required."
(Appendix, 168A) The District Court relied heavily on its prior finding
that voluntary desegregation would only succeed in Coloma if the district
hired some minority faculty. The Appeals Court reversed the District
Court's Remedial Order Case Name: Michelle Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education 346 F. Supp. 766; 1971 U.S. Dist. Plaintiff: Michelle Oliver Defendant: Kalamazoo Board of Education Location: Kalamazoo, Michigan Year: Argued December 9, 1982, Decided May 6, 1983, Significant Points: The issues presented in this proceeding involve
the scope of the district court's remedial powers in a school desegregation
case once a constitutional violation has been determined. The primary
issue is whether the court has the power, nine years after issuing an
injunction desegregating the students, to impose a quota for the hiring
of black teachers and, concomitantly, to override the contractual seniority
rights and state statutory tenure rights of white teachers in order
to prevent the layoff of a disproportionate number of black teachers. The district court erred in imposing a quota system for the hiring
and composition of the teaching staff of the Kalamazoo school system.
Nullification of the seniority and tenure rights of white teachers was
also error. Case Name: National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, Lansing Branch Plaintiff: NAACP, Lansing Branch Defendant: Lansing, Michigan Board of Education Location: Lansing, Michigan Year: February 8, 1978 Significant Points: This school desegregation suit was commenced in
1972 to determine whether the Lansing Board of Education violated the
constitutional rights of the district's schoolchildren by denying them
equal educational opportunity on the basis of race. The court found
a newly elected school board's Case Name: Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v. Ann Arbor School District Board 463 F. Supp. 1027 Plaintiff: Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children Defendant: Ann Arbor School District Board Location; Ann Arbor, Michigan Year: July 12, 1979 Significant Points: It was alleged that the children speak a version
of "black English," "black vernacular" or "black
dialect" as their home and community language that impedes their
equal participation in The court required that the Board take "appropriate action"
to overcome language barriers which impede equal participation in instructional
programs. The court found that a language barrier exists which impedes
the teachers' attempts to teach reading of standard English to students
who speak "black English" in their |
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